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Preface
For most of the past three decades, policies
crafted to address the relationships
between human population and economicdevelopment have rested on two basic
assumptions. The first is that rapid population growth is among the most important
obstacles to global progress on problems of
poverty, development, and environment.
The second is that providing women with
contraception to eliminate unwanted pregnancy is the single best strategy for achieving a stable global population at the
earliest possible time. As a result, the term
"population policy" has for all intents and
purposes become synonymous with the
delivery of contraception and other family
planning services to reduce birth rates.
Roughly four billion dollars per year is
spent on family planning and related programs. And an estimated 57 percent of married couples of reproductive age worldwide
use some form of birth control. 1 In terms of
effective policy, such services are indeed
essential parts of the broader whole. But
experience now confirms what a growing
number of researchers and advocates long
have contended: availability of family planning services is a necessary but far from
sufficient condition to achieve global population stabilization.

There are a number of reasons why this
is so. One is that in countries where a
high proportion of people are under fifteen, populations continue to grow at a
relatively rapid pace even after birth rates
have fallen markedly. Addressing this
"population momentum," requires a mix
of social and economic policies that go
beyond contraception.

Another is that the desire for relatively
large families remains the norm in many
countries. A combination of gender
inequity, economic insecurity, political conflict, and traditional mores, among other
things, keeps birth rates high in much of
sub-Saharan Africa, parts of Asia, and in the
Middle East. In fact, under conditions prevailing in many of these countries, having
large numbers of children remains a rational social and economic strategy, especially
for women. Here again, access to contraception is a only a part of the solution.
Recently, challenges to conventional population policy by an acl hoc coalition of
researchers, policy-makers, and advocates,
have brought about a shift in the rhetoric if
not yet the practice of population policies.
Concerned about neglect of the root causes
of persistent poverty, inequity, and poor
health, particularly among women, this
group seeks to put these and other "missing pieces" of the population puzzle onto
the global agenda. 2
They argue that population policies must
be integrated with broader strategies aimed
at improving the quality of people's lives,
and that health and human rights objectives
should form the bedrock of all such strategies. And, they maintain, family planning
programs should be driven by the needs of
people, rather than by demographic targets.
Such international debates, however, are
meaningful only to the extent that they are
grounded in and adaptable to local and
regional realities. The following chapters
explore the relevance of international

debates to realities of the Middle East, an
important but understudied region that has
often been subject to stereotyping. The
region's wealth of traditions and diverse
contemporary experience offer insights to
those who venture beyond the surface
appearances.

The paper is written as -we approach the
historic UN International Conference on
Population and Development, in the hope
both of increasing understanding of an
important region of the world, and refining
our grasp of international issues.

This paper is intended to serve as a broad
introduction to the connections between
family, gender, and population policy in
the Middle East. It is based on studies by a
diverse group of Middle East scholars, and
the discussions they generated in Cairo at
an international symposium sponsored by
the Population Council in February. 1994.

Jocli Jacobson, Director
The Health and Development Policy Project
July 1994

Introduction
International debates over appropriate population policies rest on a number of
assumptions that do not adequately reflect
the realities of developing countries.
Among these are the notions that -women
can act autonomously on matters of pregnancy, contraception, and reproductive
health, and that improvements in basic
indicators, such as female education and
the level of employment, will automatically
translate into reduced fertility. Subjecting
these and other assumptions to close scrutiny in one setting such as the Middle
East can provide a valuable test of the
scope and effectiveness of policies
designed, by and large, in the West.
The Middle East is a region of vast diversity, encompassing the Arabic-speaking

countries of North Africa, the Nile Valley,
Western Asia and the Arabian Peninsula, in
addition to Turkey and Iran. It is a part of
the v/orld that has been much studied, but
often misunderstood. The decision to hold
the 1994 UN International Conference on
Population and Development in Egypt provides an opportunity to review the situation
in this region and the processes that are
contributing to its rapid demographic and
social transformation.
Until recently, pivotal international debates
around family, gender and population policy have taken little account of the social
realities of the Middle East, leaving many
critical questions unaddressed. For example, what are the implications of policies
based on individual "rights" and "choice" in

Countries of the Middle lictsi

a region -where both culture and religion
clearly value the priorities of community
and the family? And how can the positive
features of family stability be maintained in
the face of rapid changes in gender relations and economic circumstances?
Researchers of the Middle East suggest that
the failure to address these and other questions has lead to widespread misunderstanding of a complex and dynamic region.
It is widely assumed, for example, that
Islam, the dominant faith in a region rich in
religious diversity, is the major roadblock
to women's autonomy and improved welfare. Those familiar with the region note
that this view is rooted in the history of
contacts between the West and the Muslim
world. They see this as one of the many
misperceptions about the region that have
been reinforced by the recent spread of
Islamic fundamentalist movements throughout the Middle East.
A growing body of work by scholars of the
Middle East has begun to clarify the true
place of religion in understanding gender
relations in the region. They point out that,
in some cases, the interpretations of Islamic
laws and religious texts by governments
and clerics have been more conservative
than the texts themselves underscoring
the influence of culture, time, and place in
religious practice.
Therefore, "despite the polarization of
opinions on the subject of women's position in societies of the Middle East," states
Carla Makhlouf Obermeyer. "there are elements in Islam which can be interpreted to
justify a more egalitarian approach to
reproductive rights, one that is more
responsive to women's needs, and is
espoused by a large number of Muslims." 1
As examples presented later in this essay
show, women and men throughout the
region are beginning to explore the potential within existing legal frameworks to
address gender disparities.
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The dynamics of families and women's
roles within them are a crucial part of international debates over the scope and definition of population policies. Among the
assumptions about families that have guided population policies in the Middle East
and elsewhere is the view that men are the
sole or primary providers of economic support. At first glance, at least two facts
appear to confirm this assumption in the
Middle East.
First, official data show women are underrepresented in the salaried categories of the
formal labor force. Second, according to
the Islamic legal code in place in nearly all
Middle Eastern countries, men are legally
bound to support their families.
Women throughout the region, however,
do indeed contribute a large and often critical share of family income. Surveys using
broader definitions of -what constitutes
"work" find that significant proportions of
women in several Middle Eastern countries
are engaged in agricultural and other laborintensive "informal sector" activities. The
value of women's domestic work, and the
value of goods produced for home consumption also are forms of income provided by women. Moreover, evidence is
mounting that the economic responsibilities
of women are increasing as the proportion
of households headed or supported by
women rises. 1
And as recent studies from the Middle East
and several other regions reveal, the connections between birth rates and conventional indicators of women's status, such as
education, are more complex than previously believed, and vary widely from one
country to another. More attention needs to
be paid to how these realities affect and
are affected by demographic trends.
Understanding how these global issues are
played out in the context of Middle Eastern
countries, and reflecting on how the

experience of these countries can in turn
provide a new perspective on international
debates were two key motivations behind
the program of policy research and dissemination jointly launched by the Research
Division and the West Asia and North
Africa office of the Population Council in
1993. Scholars of the Middle East representing several disciplines met to determine a priority list of topics, and then
prepared policy reviews covering several
countries in the region.

organization activists, and policy makers.
Papers presented at the symposium analyzed the political conditions under which
policies are shaped and carried out, the
cultural context in which existing population policies operate, and the extent to
which health and family planning services
are effective in improving the well-being of
the populations they serve. (A list of presentations is found at the end of this booklet. Wherever quotations appear in the text,
they refer to these presentations.)

These efforts culminated in an international
symposium entitled "Family, Gender, and
Population Policy: International Debates
and Middle Eastern Realities," convened in
Cairo from February 7 to 9, 1994, and
attended by researchers, non-governmental

The chapters that follow present a distillation of the ideas discussed at the Cairo
symposium, along with indications of
where participants believe that policy and
programs should now be directed.

nunihers uj Middle /ici.\/eni icomen
are enrolled in higher education.

CHAPTER 1

In Context: Demographic and
Social Trends in the Middle East
A profile of the Middle East reveals a group
of countries that is at once cohesive and
strikingly diverse. The great majority of
people in this region, for example, are
linked by a cohimon language (Arabic),
religion (Islam), and cultural identity. And,
at least on the surface, they appear to share
similar demographic patterns: average birth
and population growth rates in the region
have been consistently higher over the past
two decades than the average for developing countries as a whole, and higher than
all other regions with the exception of subsaharan Africa.
These similarities have created the impression of a region that, demographically
speaking, is monolithic. A closer look
reveals that individual countries diverge
sharply in several areas. First, there is great
diversity in patterns of economic development, styles of government, and adherence
to traditional norms across the region.
Second, there is wide variation in the pace
of economic and social change experienced by countries over the past twenty
years. And third, there are important differences in how broadly population policies
are defined and implemented by various
Middle Eastern governments.
This diversity has led to situations that confound expectations about the relationships
between one set of indicators, such as the
proportion of educated women, and another, such as birth rates. In several countries
where both income per person and the
share of well-educated women are high, for
example, birth rates are too, a fact that runs
counter to conventional thinking about the
relationship between female education and
JO

family size. Conversely, in a number of
poorer countries, the transition to smaller
families is well under -way. A closer look at
the region sheds light on these patterns.

Portrait of a region
Culture and religion are the great common
denominators among the peoples of the
Middle East and North Africa. About 381
million people live in the 21 countries covered by this review, the vast majority of
whom are linked by a shared language.
Arabic, and a Muslim cultural and religious
identity.
Iran and Turkey, the two non-Arab countries of the region, also are predominantly
Muslim. (The region also contains sizable
Christian and Jewish minorities.) Together,
these countries are home to more than one
fourth of the total Muslim population
worldwide. Table 1 summarizes information about population, income and fertility
patterns.
A strong commitment to family is a defining trait of this region. The extended family
is a source of both emotional and social
support throughout the Middle East, and
marriage and childbirth are important rites
of passage. According to Islamic tradition,
marriage is viewed as the completion of an
important obligation. Religion and social
custom restrict sexuality to marriage, and
women are encouraged to become pregnant soon after marriage. As in other parts
of the developing world, children traditionally contribute to the economy of the
household and are expected to provide for
their parents in old age.

Both Islam and tradition emphasize the role
of women as wives and mothers. In fact,
because children enhance women's status
in the family and community, these roles
provide a sense of great psychological and
economic security. Childbearing also is
seen as a way of solidifying a marriage and
ensuring its stability. As one Moroccan saying goes, "children break the wings of the
husband," reminding him of his responsibilities toward his family. In effect, children
are part of a woman's insurance policy
against abandonment or divorce by her
husband."
Large families remain the norm in Muslim
societies. Data for 1993 indicate that total
fertility rates the average number of children per woman* in the Middle East
remain high relative to other southern
countries. Women bear more than five children on average in 11 out of the 21 countries of the region, including Iraq, Jordan,
Saudi Arabia, and Syria. A regional national
average fertility rate of 5.2 contrasts with
regional averages for Latin America and
South Asia of 3-1 and 4.2, respectively. At
the same time, because of social pressures
to limit sexual activity to married couples,
the share of out-of-weellock births in the
Middle East is believed to be low compared
to other parts of the world.
A picture of diversity
Shared traits and regional averages obscure
the important gaps in levels of income and
population size that exist among the countries of the Middle East. Per capita income

in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), for
example, the country with the highest level
in the region is 43 times higher than that of
Yemen, one of the poorest countries and a
close neighbor (see Table 1).
Not surprisingly, the oil-producing states of
the Gulf have high incomes relative to
other countries in the region. Per capita
income in the LJAE is over $22,000 per
year, roughly equal to that in the United
States. The "middle income" countries of
the region arc those which do not have
extensive oil -wealth on -which to draw.
Several of these countries, including
Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Tunisia, have
developed labor- and skill-intensive industrial and service sectors. Morocco at the
bottom of this group in terms of income
per person relies on a combination of
agriculture, industry, and tourism at home,
and the remittances of Moroccans who emigrated abroad. The countries with the lowest per capita incomes are those that still
rely heavily on subsistence agriculture,
such as Somalia, Mauritania and Yemen, or
a combination of agriculture, services and
industry, such as Egypt.''
Large disparities in total fertility rates also
are found within the Middle East. Women
give birth to an average of 7 children each
in at least two countries Yemen and
Somalia and over 6 children each in
seven others, including Libya, Iran,
Mauritania. Syria, Oman, Saudi Arabia and
Sudan. In Lebanon, Tunisia and Turkey, by
contrast, the average is 3.1, 3.4, and 3-5,
respectively (see Table 1).

" Total fertility Kite* a.s referred to throughout rhi.s paper arc a measure cnnstruai:il tu reflect [he average number of births a woman
would lie expected to have at the end of her reproductive years. It
i.s important to note that they do not include a measurement of
men'.s fertility.
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Recent data suggest that the average number of children per woman of reproductive
age has in fact fallen in several Middle
Eastern countries over the past decade.
According to data on total fertility rates collected between 1985 and 1990, for example, Egyptian couples in their childbearing
years were having an average of 4.5 children toward the end of the eighties. More
recent estimates indicate that the total fertility rate in Egypt has fallen to just below 4
children per couple.* Similarly, indications
are that couples in Tunisia now are averaging 3-3 children each, as opposed to over 4
in the late eighties. And the average number of children per couple in Turkey seems
to have declined as well, from 4.1 in 1985
to 3.5 in 1990."
Although in many parts of the developing
world, poverty and high fertility go hand in
hand, this is not the case for several countries in the Middle East. The countries in
which fertility has fallen most significantly,
' According H> the most recent F.gyptian Demographic and Health
Survey (DHS). Egypt's total fertility rate appears u> have declined
sharply since lyKH. to uhom 3,y. Some demographers, suggest that
the degree to which Egypt's TFK has declined, though considerable,
m.iv be si imewh.11 less than these estimates suggest.

Egypt, Tunisia, and Turkey, are among the
poor and middle income countries.
Conversely, high total fertility rates are
found in several of the wealthiest countries,
including Oman (6.7), Saudi Arabia (6.4).
and the UAE (4.5). Patterns such as these
confirm that the pathways linking income to
fertility are by no means uniform, an issue
to which we return later in this paper.
Projections for the future

Today's population growth rates** confirm
the Middle East is destined to accomoclate a
much larger number of people in the corning years. One reason is that while death
rates have fallen markedly in the majority
of countries, birth rates have declined
much more slowly overall. At the same
time, because about 40 percent of the
region's population now is under age 15
and will soon enter reproductive age, the
overall number of people will continue to
expand -well after replacement level fertility
is reached."
** A population's growth rate is a fu
death rate and net migration rate.

Across the region, the average population
growth rate is 3 percent per year. United
Nations projections based on current trends
suggest the regional population will roughly double in the next thirty years, reaching
760 million by 2025. In absolute terms,
much of this growth will occur in just a
handful of places. For example, six countries Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Morocco,
Turkey, and Sudan with a total of 273
million people between them in 1994. now
account for 72 percent of the region's population. Current projections imply these six
countries alone will add another 218 million people to the region in the next three
decades, accounting for nearly 60 percent
of the total population increase in the
Middle East in that period.'
Challenging convention
Planners and policy-makers concerned
with population growth rates often look for
signal indicators to suggest the future path
of demographic change in a given country.
These may include a rise in personal
income, as well as improvements in indicators of health status and life expectancy,
and in the social and economic status of
women.
Conventional measures of women's status
such as the level of women's education,
their age at marriage, and their labor force
participation frequently are cited in relation to impact on birth rates. Education provides women with both the tools and
opportunities to follow paths other than
early marriage and childbearing. As a result,
substantial increases in female education
rates often are correlated with a rise in age
at marriage, a rise in the age at first birth,
and a decline in desired family size, leading
eventually to smaller families overall.
Some countries in the region seem to fit
the expected patterns. In Somalia, for
example, both income per person ($170
per year) and female literacy rates are low
and total fertility rates are high: Somali
women bear an average of seven children.

Ahotv: making the si in -raised bread of Upper Egypt;
Opp(jsile.- carrying water
— daily chores of many rural women
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Table 1:
Background Statistics on
Countries of the Middle East

Total population
in thousands
(1995)

Average
number of
children per
woman

Per capita income
(gross national
product)
(1991 dollars)

(1990-95)
Country
Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Iran, Islamic Republic of
Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
Mauritania
Morocco
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Somalia
Sudan
Syrian Arab Republic
Tunisia
Turkey
United Arab Emirates
Yemen

(1)

(2)

(3)

28,581
578
58,519
66,720
21,224
4,755
1,604
3,028
5,407
2,335
28,260
1,822
490
17,608
10,173
28,960
14,775

4.9
3.8
4.1

1,980
7,130
610
2,170
2,340*
1,050
13,400*
2,150*
5,420*
510
1,030
6,120
14,770
7,820
170*
480*

8,933
62,032
1,785
13,897

6.0
5.7
5.7
3.7
3.1
6.4
6.5
4.4
6.7
4.4
6.4
7.0
6.1
6.2
3.4
3.5
4.5
7.2

1,160
1,500
1,780
20,140
520

* Figures for 1988, except for Lebanon anc Iraq (figures for 1987)
Source: Col. 1 & 2: United Nations (1993), World Population Prospects: The 1992 Revision, New York: The United Nations.
Col. 3: World Bank (1993), World Development Report, Washington , D.C.: Oxford University Press.
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Lack of opportunity for women means that,
apart from the emotional rewards of building a family, children also represent a form
of long-term investment and security.
But in several Middle Eastern countries, the
number of children per woman of reproductive age far exceeds what might be expected
given general living standards, and improvements in areas such as health and female
education. In Jordan, for example, where the
total fertility rate is 5.7 children per woman,
over 75 percent of the female population is
literate, one of the highest rates in the
region. Moreover, income levels are high relative to other countries. Average annual
income per person in Jordan is $1,050 dollars, as opposed to Morocco and Egypt
which have substantially lower incomes and
fertility.
The situation in Syria, which realixed notable
gains in female education from 1970 to 1981.
also is puzzling. The share of women who
could not read dropped from about 76 percent to 56 percent over the decade. Yet,
according to Youssef Courbage, The average

number of children per couple in Syria
stayed fixed at nearly 8 per couple until the
mid-to-late eighties, when it began to
decline. And today it is still high at more
than six children per couple. The persistence
of high fertility despite increasing education
suggests that -within each level of education,
total fertility rates in the country actually
increased. Similar anomalies exist in several
other countries, including Iran, Saudi Arabia,
and Kuwait (see box 1).
Researchers in the Middle East have begun to
explore the reasons behind these unexpected
patterns. They are uncovering a multi-layered
story that takes into account state policies, the
politics of family and religion, and factors
affecting women's status. They are also finding significant variations in demographic
behavior within a number of countries, pointing to the need for analyses of national economic development strategies and outcomes.
These important issues, and the research they
are generating, are summarized in the next
:
three chapters.
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Box 1

Women's Status and Fertility in Kuwait
As oil -wealth has transformed this small country of the Arabian Gulf, marked changes in the status of women
have taken place. Literacy rates in Kuwait rose from 18 percent in 1965 to around 80 percent in 1993. And
between 1989 and 1993, there were sharp declines in the gender gaps in education at the primary, intermediate,
and secondary levels. The share of females enrolled in to university education also has increased.
Education is cited as a critical factor in improving women's access to employment in Kuwait's rapidly modernizing economy. Roughly 25 percent of all Kuwaiti women -worked in the formal labor force in 1993, up from 2
percent in 1965. Moreover, a large proportion, estimated at 49 percent of female workers -were employed as
professionals teachers, doctors, and technicians.
Simultaneous with these trends have been increases in age at marriage and knowledge of contraceptive use
among Kuwaiti women, and a decline in infant mortality rates. Contrary to expectations, however, these various changes did not translate into dramatic fertility decline, notes Nasra Shah.
An analysis of policies and societal values suggest several factors are at play. One, Shah points out, is the general feeling among Kuwaiti citizens that large families and rapid growth rates are desirable because "we need
more Kuwaitis". Such sentiments are fueled by the relatively small population size of Kuwait compared with its
neighbors. They also result from a perceived need to reduce the country's reliance on foreign labor.
Other considerations also are important. High levels of immigration from poorer countries mean there are large
numbers of people willing to perform low-wage childcare and domestic work, lessening the burden on Kuwaiti
women of juggling both jobs and large families. And Kuwait's relative wealth enables the government to pay for
the services needed for a growing population. "These subsidies are very important in the fertility equation,"
states Shah. For every child, families receive a subsidy of about $160 per month, education is free up to the university level, and the government finances higher education abroad. In addition, Shaw notes that the government also guarantees jobs for all graduates. This pronatalist policy climate and the traditionally high norms for
family size have contributed to delaying a demographic transition in Kuwait.
Source: Nasra Shah.
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The spread of education is changing the It res of many girls and women
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CllAPTKR 2

The Role of the State,
Society, and Religion
The roles played by the state, by civil society, and by religious institutions in influencing the reproductive decisions of
couples and individuals are perhaps the
most important yet least -well-understood
dimensions of population policy in the
Middle East. Of these elements, Islam is
frequently singled out as the most significant factor behind the high birth rates evident in much of the Middle East. And in
fact, in the majority of countries, government policy, Islamic law and Muslim tradition are closely linked, albeit to varying
degrees.
In some countries, governments both follow and promote a combination of
sbari'a* , the Islamic code, and secular laws
and customs. In others, a theocratic state is
headed by religious leaders and institutions, and laws are based almost exclusively on conservative interpretations of
sbari'a. But the ways in which state and
religion interact to influence demographic
trends arc far more complex than may be
appaent to outside observers.

Divergent objectives
With respect to population policy, countries in the Middle East fall into three broad
categories'". The first group is composed of
countries whose policy objectives over the
past decade or so reflect explicit goals to
reduce birth rates and slow population
growth. Among these are Algeria, Egypt,
Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey.

Shiiri'n. (ho Islamic code of law. i.s based on inlLTprct.ilions of the
Koran, the Hadith (.sayin^.s of ihc Prophet Moh.imincd). and [he
Sunna (the biography of Mohammed). The laws that are derived
from these sources and their application in different contexts vary
depending on particular schools ol [urispruclcnce.
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Governments in the second group, including Bahrain, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Sudan,
and Yemen (until 1992), have not formulated policies aimed at reducing fertility, but
nonetheless support the provision of family
planning services.
In the third group are those countries
including Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia
whose objectives are to encourage high
fertility and expansion of their populations.
Pro-natalist policies have been formulated
by governments seeking to increase the
political weight of their nations in regional
conflicts, or in sparsely-populated countries
to reduce their reliance on imported labor.
But pro-natalist policies have recently
changed in some countries. Iran, for example, has witnessed several reversals of state
policies. While the government of Shah
Reza Pahlavi sought to reduce fertility, a
pro-natalist policy was put in place after
the Islamic revolution. More recently, the
government of Iran has adopted a policy
aimed at slowing population growth
through vigorous promotion of family planning (see Chapter 3).
Among the countries whose current policy
objectives are to reduce fertility, Tunisia
and Turkey have been the most successful
according to conventional measures,** in
no small part because of legal reforms to
improve the economic and social status of
women. In Morocco too, birth rates have
fallen, although to a different degree and

** The "success" of a family pl.mnini; program has li>i\y been i;aui;cd
by the decree [o which it raises contraceptive prevalence rates :ind
reduces fertility. These indicators tell us neither about how well
programs meet the needs of individuals and couples for quality
reproductive health care, nor about the potential for or existence of
human rights abuses. These issues are addressed in later chapters.

for somewhat different reasons. Egypt's
national program, although the oldest, had
slow gains until the mid 1980s, and then
showed increased momentum.
In a review of Egypt's 30-year population
policy, Saacl Eldin Ihrahim evaluated the
government's ability to achieve two major
objectives. One is to mobilize state agencies to implement the policy effectively.
The other is the ability to influence "civil
society", the diverse network of political
groups, civic organizations, peers, neighbors, and friends through which individuals
get most of their information, and through
which social values are transmitted and
adapted.
Ibrahim and a team of colleagues undertook an extensive survey of policy-makers,
mid-level officials, community leaders, and
individual women to gauge how seriously
they viewed population as a national problem. Despite positive ancl public support
from the President, decision-makers directly below him showed weak awareness of
and commitment to the official policy.

Along with many mid-level technical
administrators and a surprising number of
doctors, they believe that Egypt's problems
lie elsewhere. The majority of community
religious leaders interviewed held negative
views both on the overall population policy, ancl on the use of contraception. Civic
leaders, by contrast, were found to be more
concerned about rapid population growth
than those of any other category except for
family planning social workers. In general,
this group was both more positive about
the role of the government and citi/en
cooperation in curbing growth rates than
any other. The survey team also found that
women were more inclined than other
groups to regard rapid population growth
as a problem for Egypt (see Box 2}. These
results and recent media debates suggest
that considerable public education efforts
are needed if clearer policy consensus is to
be achieved.
Migration and employment
Other aspects of state policy have great bearing on the economic and social conditions
faced by families, and in turn, on their

Professions which irere once exclnsirel}' incite tire noir u[>e)ihit> tu mum en
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Box 2.

EGYPT'S POPULATION POLICY:
VIEWS FROM THE COMMUNITY
In a series of interviews in 1993, Egyptians at various levels of policy making and implementation were asked
whether population issues were a significant national challenge. Some of the responses at local levels were
unexpected:
Doctors and Social Workers: Among staff of family planning clinics, forty-one percent mentioned population
trends as one of Egypt's main challenges. Doctors were much less likely than social workers, however, to
believe population is a problem and more likely to be influenced by conservative religious views. In fact, doctors were among the least supportive respondants to the government's population policy, while clinic social
workers were the most supportive.
Community Religious Leaders: Over 81 percent of imams (mosque preachers} interviewed denied population growth was a problem in Egypt or any other Islamic country. Most indicated that they preach in mosques
and advise in private against 'birth control' of any kind. This group, like doctors, were concerned about excessive western influence on national population goals.
Civic leaders: Community non-governmental (NGO) activists were more concerned about rapid population
growth than those in any other category except for social workers. Nearly 60 percent cited the issue among
Egypt's main challenges. In general, this group was more positive about the role of NGOs and citizen cooperation than any other. Some criticized the government for ambiguity in its policy on population and education,
and for what they sa'w as undue restrictions on NGO activity. On the whole, however, they were supportive of
the national population policy.
Women: The survey team interviewed 500 married women ages 15 to 49- Fourteen percent mentioned spontaneously that population is a serious challenge for Egypt and 63 percent did so in response to probing questions. Confirming previous research, the survey found that nearly all Egyptian women know about family planning methods (modern and traditional) and where they are available; women are generally supportive of the
government efforts to provide services and especially positive about the role of NGOs.
Source: Saad Eddin Ibrahim.
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reproductive choices. Patterns of economic
development, employment, and migration
may interact in surprising ways to affect
reproductive decisions at the household level.
In Morocco, for example, the economic situation appears at first to be less conducive
to small families than that of Egypt. Yet,
until only recently, Morocco experienced
much sharper declines in birth rates than
Egypt. Between I960 and 1990, total fertility rates fell by 30 percent in Egypt, from
6.7 to 4.7 children per couple. Over the
same period, the average number of children born to Moroccan couples fell by 46
percent (see Table 2). An analysis of the
divergent trends in these two countries by
Youssef Courbage revealed some unexpected findings: "On the basis of land, economic indicators, standard of living, overall
education and female education, one
would predict that Morocco would be at a
disadvantage. Yet the fertility transition in
Morocco has been faster and more sustained than in Egypt."
Courbage found a number of apparent
inconsistencies. In Morocco, each year of
female education had a greater impact on
birth rates than in Egypt, and the average
age-at-marriage and rate of contraceptive
use rose more dramatically with education.
Several years of female primary school education were associated with a decline in the
average number of a children per woman
of 50 percent. In Egypt, comparable levels
of education lead to an 11 percent reduction. In seeking to explain these differences, Courbage considered the effect of
several factors.
In Morocco, women make up over one
fourth of salaried workers, compared to
about 14 percent in Egypt. Women's
employment, according to Courbage, leads
to an openness to the outside world, provides the economic security of an
autonomous salary, and raises the cost of
children in relation to a woman's potential
earning ability.

Other factors, Courbage found, were also at
play. Moroccan citizens, for example, bear
a higher tax burden than do Egyptians. The
contribution of Egyptian citizens to state
revenues fell sharply in the seventies and
eighties due to an increase in oil income
and other sources of government revenue.
In Morocco, by contrast, taxes rose sharply
in 1975 when the world market price of
major exports fell, and the shortfall was
made up in taxes.
Finally, migration appears to play an interesting role in Middle Eastern fertility transitions. Large numbers of people from both
Egypt and Morocco emigrated abroad in
the seventies and eighties, affecting the
reproductive decisions and consumption
habits in their home countries in different
ways. Egyptians tended to migrate to the
Arabian Gulf countries, societies that are
strongly pro-natalist and thus encouraging
of large families. Courbage argues that
when most of these emigrants returned,
they supported rather than eroded the
desire for large families in Egypt.
Job-seekers from Morocco, on the other
hand, went primarily to Europe. Courbage
theorizes that those Moroccan emigrants
influenced attitudes on family size in two
ways. One was by their own example:
Moroccans transplanted to Europe and living in a society where smaller families "were
the norm, followed suit by having fewer
children themselves; they then transmitted
these values to relatives back home. The
other was through the effect of remittances
to rural families, which enabled them to
migrate to cities, where girls are more likely
to be educated, women more likely to work
for pay, and fertility norms are lower.
Thus, the combined effects of female education and labor force participation, government fiscal policies, and different
patterns of international migration have
produced the more rapid transition seen in
Morocco.
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Table 2:
Changing Demographics
in Egypt & Morocco, 1960-1990
Egypt

Indicator
I960

1990

Morocco
I960

1990

Total Fertility
Rate

6.7

4.7

7.2

3.9

Female Age
at Marriage

20

22

17

25

Infant Mortality

155

53

130

53

Unable to Read

84

66

96

73

In Formal Labor
Force

8

12

12

25

Share of Women:

Source: Youssef Courbage.

Turkey's head start
The transition from high to low fertility in
Turkey has been described by some
researchers as unique to the region. Gem
Behar investigates the reasons for this, using
both historical and contemporary sources of
data. Birth rates began to fall in urban areas of
Turkey as early as the second half of the last
century, well before modern methods of contraception had been invented. Censuses taken
in 1885 and 1907 by officials of the Ottoman
empire indicate that total fertility rates in the
capital, Istanbul, were 3.5 and 3-8, respectively, a level attributed to a combination of rising
age-at-marriage and the widespread use of
withdrawal, vaginal douche, and abortion.
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In 1965, Turkey put into place both an official population policy and a family planning program. By 1990, the nationwide
total fertility rate was 3-5, among the lowest
in the region. Behar argues that by looking
only at crude demographic indicators it
might seem that this decrease is mainly a
result of the official family planning policy.
Rut "a social transformation that favored
women's education, and an increase in
their status both within the household and
within society at large has played a more
crucial role [than contraceptive delivery]."
Turkey was, in fact, first among Muslim
nations to reform the legal code toward
granting women greater parity in the areas
of marriage, divorce, child custody, and
inheritance. These reforms, begun in the
1920s by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, were part
of a broader strategy to create a secular
society ancl undermine traditional authority
structures.
Behar argues that these changes -were
made in the interest of modernization, and
not gender equity per se. He points to the
fact that appreciable economic and social
gaps between men and women, and
between women in rural ancl urban areas
still exist. Moreover, controls on the
recently
movement only
women's
governmentonly
permitted
removed
sanctioned women's advocacy groups.
Despite these limitations, however, the
end result of these reforms was to create a
climate of political support for the expansion of women's autonomy. Also unique to
Turkey has been the high level of male
involvement in couples' decisions to
restrict fertility (see Chapter 4).

Tradition and reform in Tunisia
Similarly rapid changes in birth rates have
taken place in Tunisia over the past few
decades. Tunisia's total fertility rate of 3-3 is
even lower than that of Turkey. Access to
contraception and abortion is virtually universal, and over half of married couples of
reproductive age practice family planning.
Widespread availability of maternal and
child health care services has reduced the
rate of maternal deaths in the country to
the lowest in the region.
Like Turkey, a large part of the story of
Tunisia's success in reducing births lies outside the walls of the family planning clinic.
President Bourguiba, in office from 1957 to
1987, introduced wide ranging reforms. But
unlike Turkey, Tunisia's reforms "were made
within the context of the Islamic legal code,
rather than outside it.
The reforms in Tunisia, according to Carla
Makhlouf Obermeyer, constituted "a major
step toward an egalitarian definition of the
rights and obligations of husbands and
wives" in Islamic society. In justifying the
abolition of men's right to marry more than
one wife, Bourguiba referred to passages in
the Quran that support his position. "Thus,"
notes Makhlouf Obermeyer, "a major break
with tradition could take place, -without
severing the moral links with Islam.""
Other legal changes granting women
greater rights in marriage, divorce, and
inheritance, were also passed. In order to
reduce unplanned pregnancy and the harmful effects of unsafe abortion, Tunisia instituted legal abortion services within the
locally-accepted interpretations of Islamic
lav/ (see also Chapter 3).
The country profiles reviewed here point to
the great diversity of paths taken by Middle
Eastern societies to -achieve their development and demographic objectives. They
also point to the possibility for reforming
gender and reproductive health policies
while respecting cultural and religious traditions.

You>if> women work us agricultural
laborers, for hire or for their families
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CHAPTKR 3

Women and Men in Families:
Ideal and Reality
Traditional family norms in the Middle East
emphasize the cohesiveness of bonds
among relatives and their importance for
individual identity. According to the ideal,
the family is defined by different but equally valued roles for men and women. The
stability of families and the .security of individuals thus rest on complementarity, men
fulfilling their roles as providers, and
women as nurturers. But while a strong
commitment to family remains evident
throughout the Middle East, these ideals
only partly reflect the complex reality of
people's lives in a rapidly changing world.
Marriage remains virtually universal, and
divorce is relatively rare in comparison to
other regions; however, disparities between
the rights and obligations of men and
women within families have led to conditions of gender inequality, in which men
have greater leeway in matters of marriage,
divorce, and inheritance.
Such differences hold important implications because they run counter to some of
the fundamental assumptions about the
family on which the majority of population
policies are based. Among these assumptions are that men are economically
responsible for families; that resources will
be shared equally among family members,
regardless of age or sex; and that husbands
and wives have an equal say and can
achieve consensus in matters of childbearing and contraception.'-1 Research findings
presented at the Population Council symposium call these assumptions into question, suggesting that greater attention must
be given to actual gender and generational
relations within Middle Eastern families.
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Equally imprecise are some of the widelyheld beliefs about the influence of religion
and tradition on the status of women, in a
region where indicators of female status are
low relative to men. Pointing to passages
referring to differential treatment of the
sexes on matters of marriage, divorce, and
inheritance, some writers suggest that the
Qur'an (Islam's holy book) views women
as inherently inferior, and Islam is often
cited as a major obstacle to achieving gender equity.
But these ideas reflect a confusion between
fundamental principles of Islam, which a number of scholars assert are inherently egalitarian, and traditions that have evolved
historically. Many Muslims recognize that there
is a difference between Islam and what
Muslims do: Islam is a code of ethics, while
what Muslims do is affected by culture, place,
and time. While these issues are widely debated within the region, evidence suggests that a
number of today's laws are a product of the
temporal context in which Islam emerged centuries earlier. And contemporary policies
affecting women's status, notes Carla Makhlouf
Obermeyer, reflect the ideology of groups in
power as well as changing economic, political,
and social circumstances (see Box 3)Equally importantly, the concepts of 'autonomy' and 'choice', which are pivotal in the
international population debates, are influenced by values and experiences that vary
widely, even within one region or country.
Recent research on expressions of female
autonomy among Egyptian women, for
example, found age and class differences,
and contradictions between what women
accept for themselves and their aspirations
for daughters. Laila Nawar, Cynthia B. Lloyd,

Box 3
Islam and Gender: A Historical Perspective

Islam, like the other two monotheistic religions of the Middle East, emerged in a specific temporal context that
can be characterized as patriarchal, a context that is to a certain extent reflected in the sacred texts. The emergence of Islam in Arabia is widely believed to have resulted in an improvement in women's status, and
reformists and feminists have repeatedly argued that the doctrine lends itself to an egalitarian interpretation.
Still, the historically dominant tradition in Islam, as in Christianity and Judiasm, stresses the fundamental differences between the sexes and defines different social roles and legal statuses for men and women.
The dominant interpretations of Islam, with their emphasis on jurisprudence, are by no means a necessary
development of the religion. A number of Quranic verses address men and women as believers and stress their
equality. This clear recognition of individual believers as equal in the sight of God is key to the universalist
ethos of Islam. Some researchers have argued that in fact the legalistic emphasis of the various "schools" of
jurisprudence has developed at the expense of other aspects of religion. Today, as well as in the past, Muslim
feminists and mystics provide us with alternative visions that are more attentive to the needs of individuals and
more open to dialogue about women's situation.
Although inegalitarian aspects of marriage, inheritance, and court testimony are well-known men inherit twice
as much, their legal testimony is worth that of two women, they have a unilateral right to divorce their wife,
and can marry more than one woman interpretations of these positions have varied greatly. Aspects of Islamic
doctrine that could be used to reinforce the potential for women's autonomy and equality have received a great
deal less attention than the unequal aspects of the doctrine. Many Muslims believe that those statements in the
scriptures that stress the equality of believers before God are the authentic message of Islam, while those suggesting discrimination against women are merely reflections of the temporal conditions in which the religion
developed, and a distortion of its inherent egalitarianism.

Source: Adapted from Carla Makhlouf Obermeyer CD.

and Barbara Ibrahim used information from
two surveys to explore rural and urban
women's perceptions of autonomy, and their
role in family decision-making.

Measuring the effects of autonomy
In the broadest sense, autonomy can be
defined as an individual's ability to think and
act independently of others to achieve her
intentions. But there arc no absolutes.
Western notions of autonomy based on the
concepts of privacy and individual rights, for
example, may be less relevant to Muslim
women who value the interdependence of
individuals, families and communities. Or it
may be expressed in terms of social influence
rather than autonomy. Moreover, measuring
individual autonomy is complicated, and the
findings from survey research "where "women
are asked to report on their behaviors and
give their opinions may be confounded by
notions of what are appropriate feminine
responses with respect to autonomy.
Within these limitations, the researchers found
some clear patterns. "Overall, Egyptian -women
appear remarkably dependent on their spouses
with respect to family decision-making...[bur
they] have a stronger voice in particular decisions of most relevance to them such as family
planning and fertility." Early experiences of
autonomy are significant, and many Egyptian
women neither decide when they will leave
school, nor make the primary decision about
who they will many. In almost every area of
decision-making, autonomy was highest
among women who had the most education
and the greatest degree of economic independence, and among those living in cities.
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The negotiating power of women, particularly those who were not working for pay,
were illiterate, or who lived in rural areas,
was strongest on those matters related to
their traditional domain as wives and mothers. Few of these women exercised indesuch as
in other areas,
pendence
participation in community associations or
economic decision-making. Roughly twothirds of the women who were not wageearners, however, did not think their
husbands should make the final decision on
whether to have another child, or on children's education and marriage plans. Threequarters of them felt family planning should
be based on a joint decision between husbands and wives. The study also revealed
that both desired and completed family size
was smallest among those women who
reported making important family decisions
on their own.
These findings from the Egyptian survey
echo those of a survey of the relationship
befween female autonomy and child health
iii more than 1,300 urban Jordanian households. The study showed that low levels of
autonomy among Jordanian women and
women's unequal negotiating position
within families may be significant determinants of unwanted fertility. Women's economic dependence on men, and their

position in families that tend to be highly
stratified by age and gender, were also
important predictors of the ability to care
for their children's health needs'*.
The study of women's autonomy in Egypt
found important generational differences,
with higher levels of education and workforce participation among younger women.
implying the potential for future positive
changes in female autonomy, and by extension family welfare. Egyptian women also
want a different life for their daughters.
Even currently married women with low
personal autonomy have aspirations for
their daughters which imply "dramatic
changes in women's roles as they related to
work and fertility," according to the authors.
Over 80 percent of women approve of their
daughters working, and 54 percent think
their daughters should have no more than
two children, sentiments that are notable
even among poorly educated women.
The implications of these findings for population policy are clear, conclude the
researchers. "Investments in female education, employment, and programs to reduce
underage marriage should receive high priority, alongside the current emphasis on
family planning education and services."*

Whether recommendation.1, like lhe.se will prevail during a period
of structural adjustment in the economy is uncertain. Privati/inj*
costs of education and training could have the effect of diluting
women's trains in these areas.
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Education, employment
and family roles
Research by Philippe Fargues further supports the notion that it is not just education, but the likelihood that -women will be
involved in economic activity outside the
home that is most important both in raising
female autonomy and lowering birth rates.
"Both girls' enrollment at school and
women's work in cities are indicators that
females have a recognized place outside
the world of kin. They also suggest an
openness of men to non-patriarchal values:
openness of the father in the former case
and of the husband in the latter. They both
contribute to the increased autonomy of
women and act ... to modify their status
within the family, in particular by providing
alternatives to the roles of wife and mother
assigned by the patriarchal order."
Fargues cites the case of Palestinian women
in the Occupied Territories as an illustration
that education is not sufficient in itself to
produce new roles in the family. Data from
199J indicate that Palestinian women probably have the highest fertility in the world,
even though they also have the highest levels of education in the Arab world (with the
possible exception of Lebanese women). In
tact, says Fargues, this pattern is contrary to
expectations that the economic distress of
the Palestinian population in urban areas
would have led families to reduce the burden of numerous children.
Part of the explanation is to be found in
the political conditions of occupation,
which have inhibited the effect of an
increasing level of schooling. Indeed, data
on employment indicators show that the
education of girls does not produce the
28

expected improvement in women's status,
in large part because of limited job opportunities arising from the occupation. And
similar to the case in Kuwait, where state
support for childrearing and schooling lessened the costs for families, international
agencies operating in the territories also
provide substantial subsidies that support
large families. "One should not, however,
avoid a more political explanation," concludes Fargues. Keeping fertility high, in
spite of educational and economic conditions that -would normally bring it down,
was for years a favored strategy of resistance for many Palestinians.

Family law and personal security
Improving -women's status is linked to
reforms of the family laws now in place in
the majority of Muslim countries. This body
of law, known as the Personal Status Code,
grants men greater leeway than women in
several critical areas: divorce; polygyny
(marriage by a man to more than one
woman); rights to financial support; custody and guardianship of children; and
inheritance.
In most countries of the Middle East, a man
can exercise his legal rights simply by saying to his wife, "you are divorced." A
woman, by contrast, must go to court and
establish a legally acceptable basis for
divorce, such as her husband's impotence,
a pattern of domestic violence, or the
inability or unwillingness of her husband to
provide for her. Apart from the difficulty of
obtaining one, the prospect of a divorce is
particularly undesirable for women because
it results in a loss of social and economic
status.

Fathers involvement with their children is valued in the Middle East
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While Islamic law mandates that women
receive alimony, the legal requirement is
only for one year, and the regularity of
alimony payments is difficult to ensure. A
recent survey in Egypt found that 74 percent of divorced and separated women
were not receiving financial support from
their ex-husbands. And even collecting
child support appears to have become
more difficult as the migration of men to
distant cities has increased."

more about the historical Muslim experience than the realities of contemporary
families. The entitlement of men to a larger
share of wealth from inheritance, for example, is based on the realities of agrarian
society and assumes that men are the sole
economic providers for families. Nora Guhl
Naguib and Cynthia B. Lloyd note that "the
power of this argument is reduced -when
women assume greater responsibility for
the financial well-being of the family."

Studies show that the threat of both divorce
and widowhood heighten women's insecurity about the future. In her research on
women's status and perceptions in rural
Morocco, for example, Ralima Bourqia
found concerns about divorce, polygamy,
adultery, widowhood, and lack of legal
protection to be the most common themes
among women.

As elsewhere in the world, Middle Eastern
economies are shifting in ways that encourage wage labor among women at all
income levels. Naguib and Lloyd report
that in Egypt, for example, 95 percent of
women -who work do so to support their
families. Other surveys indicate that more
than half of urban working women arcresponsible for meeting all household
expenses. This trend was accelerated in
Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Sudan and elsewhere by massive male labor migration to
other countries in the 1970s and 1980s,
leading to irregular remittances and the
need for women who stayed behind to
become more self-sufficient. As women
take on new economic responsibilities, and
see themselves increasingly as sharing
some basic support roles with husbands,
the traditional grounds for unequal treatment under the law have less justification.

Such uncertainty, Bourqia notes, is prevalent in societies where a majority of people
live at the margins of economic security.
Fear of the future is more pronounced
among poor women than poor men, she
argues, because of women's lower status.
In Morocco, where divorce rates are high
relative to other Muslim countries, Bourqia
reports that women feel particularly vulnerable. At the same time, "women are riot
passive actors, they have devised strategies
of negotiation and strength within their
families." Women see chilclbearing as a
strategy to secure their marriage and to
ensure a source of support in the event of
divorce or widowhood.
Gender and personal status laws
Distinctions between men and women
reflected in today's legal codes may say

Applications of Islamic law are not
immutable. "It is possible," states Makhlouf
Obermeyer, "to find within Islam certain
elements that mitigate the inequalities
stemming from the legal tradition." 1 " A
number of Quranic verses address men and
women alike as believers and stress their
equality. Revised marriage contracts and

family laws have been adopted in some
countries, and are being advocated by a
broad coalition of development and
women's groups in others (see Box 4).
Islam, furthermore, explicitly recognizes
women's rights to own property, engage in
commerce, and manage their own affairs
an aspect of Islamic doctrine, Makhlouf
Obermeyer notes, that can become the
basis for broader interpretations of equality
under the law.
The relevance to population policy of these
issues becomes clear in tracing the demographic impact of various national experiments with legal reforms. A comparison of
three North African cases
Algeria,
Morocco, and Tunisia
underscores the
importance to demographic change of legal
and social reforms that give women greater
security within families. Despite similar historical experience and cultural traditions,
divergent policy over the past 25 years
resulted in very different fertility outcomes.
"Tunisia is described as one of the success
stories of fertility decline," notes Makhlouf
Obermeyer, "while Algeria has had a history of potential progress and setbacks, and
Morocco shows a pattern in between the
two, with unexpected declines in fertility
over the past decade." 16
Socioeconomic indicators contribute little to explaining these differences in
demographic outcomes. Algeria, for
example, has the highest level of per
capita income of the three countries,
and a high rate of female literacy.
Nevertheless, the country has experienced the slowest rate of fertility
decline. "Two major areas where there

is variation between these three countries," states Makhlouf Obermeyer, "are
in legal reforms of the personal status
code, and in health and family planning services."
Of the three countries, the most pervasive
reforms in the personal code were made in
Tunisia (see also Chapter 2). Marriage
requires the formal consent of the bride,
divorce legislation gives equal rights to
both parties, and the practice of polygyny,
in which men are allowed up to four wives,
is prohibited. Among the most important
effects of these reforms -was to strengthen
the bonds between husband and wife, in
part by limiting the share of inheritance
allotted to extended family members, and
in part by discouraging men from divorcing
easily. As one result, divorce rates in
Tunisia are lower than in either Algeria or
Morocco.
At the same time, Tunisia undertook a
broad-based program of family planning
that gave women more choice in matters of
reproduction. The government ensures the
availability of a wide range of contraceptive methods and sterilization. Abortion in
early stages of pregnancy is available on
request. Moreover, the maternal death rate
in Tunisia is the lowest in the region, in
large part because of the extensive network
of public clinics offering maternal and child
health care services.
Legal reforms have also been undertaken in
Morocco, although less extensive than in
Tunisia. Changes have included limits on
men's ability to divorce their wives by
repudiation and an expansion of the

Box 4.
Legal Rights and Legal Literacy:
Working for Change
"Law is an implement of social change," writes Mona Zulficar, a member of the Egyptian NGO steering committee for ICPD and a partner at a law firm in Cairo, "but [it] can only be effective if [put into] practice."
Zulficar is an expert on the application of international human rights conventions to the Middle Eastern context, in particular the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW). She is also a member of the Women, Law and Health working group, engaged in research and
legal literacy campaigns to advise women of their rights.
All Muslim marriages are based on a contract that is intended to protect the rights of both the woman and
the man. In Egypt, as in many countries of the region, however, traditional interpretations of shari'a, together with long-practiced customs limit women's rights relative to those of men. Men, for example, may divorce
their wives through the simple act of repudiation, in which a husband declares to his wife that she is
divorced. Women must go to court and establish cause, a process that may take 5 to 7 years and often entails
prohibitive costs. Yet according to both the Islamic code and civil law, women may protect themselves from
such actions, or establish broader rights, by stipulating conditions within their marriage contract that are consistent with Islamic law. For example, a woman has the right to stipulate that her husband may not take an
additional wife without her consent. She also may reserve her right to travel, to further her education, or
work outside the home.
The contract also specifies the amount of dowry to be paid to the woman by the groom at the time of marriage, or of a deferred dowry to be paid to her in the event of divorce. She may also include a provision
investing herself with the right to initiate a divorce, in effect the same right as her husband assumes automatically. But "due to social custom and lack of awareness," state Nora Guhl Naguib and Cynthia B. Lloyd,
"women exercise these options infrequently." One survey, for example, found that only 50 percent of
women in Egypt knew they were entitled to include conditions in the marriage contract. "The result," notes
Zulficar, "is a gap between law and reality, where the law provides women with legal rights that in practice
are not respected or are not exercised."
One solution advocated by Zulficar and her colleagues is a revised standard marriage contract that is intended simultaneously to serve two purposes. One is to remove the social awkwardness of discussing details of a
possible divorce just as the wedding is being planned. The other is to use publicity around the contract as a
way of raising legal awareness among women
and their families
of their rights in marriage.
The inclusion of conditions in a marriage contract could, by laying down a clear framework for the respective rights and obligations of both parties, inspire in them a feeling of confidence and security that many
believe wilt help cement the marriage. The draft for a new marriage contract in Egypt has been endorsed by
high-ranking political, religious and judicial leaders. It is currently under consideration by the Ministry of
Justice. In order to raise legal literacy among women, and to publicize the need for a new marriage contract,
an ad hoc coalition of men and women is working through political parties, NGOs, trade unions, women's
organizations, and the media in Egypt.
Sources:Mona Zulficar, comments presented during Session 1, "Reproductive Rights and Reproductive Choice:
International and Regional Perspectives,' at the Cairo Symposium; The Communications Group for the Enhancement of the
Status of Women in Egypt, 1992. Legal Rights of Egyptian Women in Theory and Practice, Cairo: The Communications
Group; and Nora Guhl-Naguib and Cynthia B. Lloyd.

32

grounds on which women may request a
divorce. Along with these reforms, an
unusually high level of female labor force
participation (see Chapter 2), and widespread access to family planning methods
and information all have contributed to the
dramatic level of fertility decline found in
Morocco.
In Algeria, by contrast, post-independence
hopes among -women for legal reform of
marriage and divorce laws -were only partially fulfilled. Reforms enacted in the early
years have more recently been reversed
under political pressure to reflect an even
more conservative interpretation of shari'a.
In the struggle for legitimacy among secular
and religious factions, women become the
'custodians' of a pure Muslim identity, and
their place within family and society
become a major stake in the struggle
bet-ween different groups for power. 1 "

Iran —
a unique policy experience
As these examples illustrate, governments can
and do reinterpret laws and policies to meet
changing circumstances. In fact, concerns
about rapid population growth have led to
dramatic changes in the population policy of
Iran under the Islamic Republic, as the analysis of Homa Hoodfar shows. Upon coming to
power in 1979, the Islamic leadership rejected
the population policy of its predecessor, Shah
Reza Pahlavi. Following the revolution, family
planning programs were associated "with the
presumed domination of Muslims by the West.
Family planning clinics were dismantled and
the supply of contraceptives, -which were primarily imported, was allowed to dwindle.

In 1986, however, concerns over a national survey
indicating
rapid
population growth caused
a major shift in policy.
Since then, the government has supported a vigorous family planning
effort, enhanced by the
presence of a strong primary health care system.
In addition, a large, wellcoordinated public education campaign has become
a staple of Iranian life.
Religious leaders give sermons on the economic,
political, and religious justifications for limiting population growth, and the
benefits
to
individual
health and family welfare
of contraceptive use and
birth spacing are promoted on television and radio.
A central part of the official policy is the social and
economic integration of
women. "However," writes
Homa Hoodfar, "given the
(traditional) gender roles and female
domesticity advocated by the government,
which is the cornerstone of their envisaged
Muslim society, the improvement of
women's position...has posecl the biggest
challenge to the government."
Female education is a top priority of the
Iranian government. In keeping with a
basic tenet of Islam that obtaining an
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education is a right and a responsibility of
all Muslims the government has invested
about 22 percent of its budget in schools,
teachers, and literacy programs for adults
who previously had no access to education.
The success of both formal and informal
education programs aimed at women has
resulted in impressive gains in female literacy rates. Similar gains have been made in
reducing formerly high rates of female
infant deaths.
Some contradictions in policies affecting
women are noted by Hoodfar. The Shah's
Family Protection Act, for example, had
reformed family laws by limiting the practice of polygyny among men. giving women
the right to file for divorce, and entitling
women to broader child support and child
custody rights in the event they were
divorcee! by their husbands. Khomeini
repealed the act, citing religious justification, despite repeated statements of support
for women's advancement and rights.
Women's income-earning opportunities in Iran
have also been limited. In giving priority for
public sector employment opportunities to
men, for example, the government has encouraged women to take early retirement, thus
reducing their share of government jobs by two
percent each year. While overall labor force
participation rates in the private sector have not
declined significantly, the share of women in
manufacturing jobs has declined from 38 percent to 14.5 percent since the early eighties.

Women market their hcnid-niude f>(.>ods: here a
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"It is within this socio-economic and legal
context that women, as social actors, assess
their options and decide the size of their family," notes Hoodfar. Given a cultural pattern
of son preference and the need to protect
themselves against financial insecurity,
women will generally have a larger family
than either they or the government would
advocate.
In the hice of contradictory policy "messages' concerning fertility and women's status, a growing number of Iranian women
have begun working with their government
for change. By using the acknowledgement
within Islamic law that husbands have no
rights to their wives' labor, Iranian women
activists have won legislation ensuring that
in case of divorce, men must compensate
their wives for the labor contributed in the
management of the household and the rearing of children. This law has raised the
costs for men of divorce and helped define
the conditions for a better legal settlement

than w o m e n had b e f o r e, w h i 1 e giving
women's domestic labor concrete value.
In other countries, governments face mounting
pressures from conservative religious movements to rescind legal reforms. The national
political dynamics are obviously complex, with
governments occasionally bending to conservative pressures regarding women, even when
these are in contradiction with other societal
objectives. In other instances, governments
have reaffirmed a commitment to gender equity and women's advancement. A national conference on women in Egypt in mid-1994
proclaimed support for reforms that would
expand women's rights within marriage and
open jobs in the judiciary to qualified candidates regardless of gender.
The current state of flux with regard to gender
issues, religion and national policy remind us
of both the resilience and the flexibility of cultural patterns affecting the family.

HIME*^

Women often prefer jobs tbev cctn combine witlj cljiicl cure: a weaver in Egypt.

, . .y . » >£* . . .

^a . . -v • X -r

><d!><i^<C>-*C><ilE><l[>-:1^^

- - -v - x

CHAPTER 4

Family Planning
and Reproductive Health:
Old Practices and New Approaches
Family planning programs around the
world are at a crossroads. To more effec
tively serve the needs of their clients for
both fertility control and good reproductive
health care, they will have to emphasize
quality as well as quantity. Increased
awareness of the human toll exacted by ill
ness and death from reproductive causes
worldwide underscores the need not only
to improve quality, but to expand the
scope of services offered. In the Middle
East, pioneering investigations have
revealed that women in rural villages face a
heavy burden of reproductive illness, much
of which goes untreated. Observations
revealed numerous obstacles, both social
and medical, to receiving adequate care
•within existing programs. This chapter
explores the obstacles and opportunities
present in the Middle East today.
Shifting targets
The growing emphasis on quality of care
both internationally and within regional
initiatives may signal the beginning of a
new era in family planning programs.
Previously, achievements were measured
by setting numerical goals, such as num
bers of contraceptive acceptors and births
averted. Initially, quantitative targets were
intended to be used as broad indicators of
changes in demographic variables, such as
fertility and mortality, or as tools for esti
mating the supply and staffing needs of
family planning programs. Today, however,
the term "target" typically refers to the
number of contraceptive users service
workers must recruit in a given year. "It is
these types of quotas," state Karima Khalil
and Cynthia Myntti, "that have raised...the
possibility of abuse of clients rights and
needs." In several Asian countries, coersion

and abuse within the family planning pro
gram have resulted from the pressures cre
ated by client quotas.
In target-based programs, clients often do
not receive the type of care they want or
need, "with serious implications for health
and human rights. Workers who are penal
ized when they fail to meet a certain quota,
"cannot be expected to offer unbiased
information, a choice of methods, or the
most clinically appropriate care." Incentives
are most often tied to "provider-controlled"
methods, such as intra-uterine devices
(ILJDs) and implants, that, once accepted,
are difficult if not impossible for an individ
ual to remove on their own.
Neither targets nor quotas are a common
feature of family planning programs in the
Middle East, although both are employed
in Egypt as well as in Turkey. Egypt's goal
is to reach a total fertility rate of 2.9, and a
contraceptive prevalence rate of 64.4 per
cent of all married couples by 2001. The
implementation plan includes a set of
annual quotas for numbers of family plan
ning users in each governorate, or adminis
trative district.
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Box 5

LESSONS LEARNED: THE PILL, INJECTABLES AND
NORPLANT IMPLANTS IN EGYPTIAN EXPERIENCE
When family planning programs neglect quality in their services, the result may be high rates of contraceptive
failure, and widespread dissatisfaction among clients. Egypt's experience with the pill is a case in point. In its
early years, the Egyptian national family planning program relied heavily on oral hormonal contraception to
lower fertility, through the distribution of pills. However, write Ezzeldin O. Hassan and Mahmoud Fathalla, dis
tribution of pill cycles to prospective clients did not ensure proper use. Without adequate information, contra
ceptive failure was a common occurrence in the early years of the program.
While service improvements are now underway, some problems persist. High rates of illiteracy among women
mean that good quality, on-site counseling must be provided to ensure clients have the information they need
to use methods safely, effectively, and comfortably. Yet counseling remains underemphasized in the family
planning program. As a result, data from the recent Demographic and Health Survey show that the rate of suc
cess among pill users in Egypt is lower than elsewhere in the developing world. Over 60 percent of pill users
surveyed in the mid 1980s, did not use the pill properly.
Similar problems have arisen with the introduction of other methods to the Egyptian program. For example,
injectable contraceptives became available in Egypt as part of a series of clinical trials throughout the world in
the early 1980's. Data from the studies on injectables were analyzed abroad and fed back to providers in poorly
disseminated reports.
Meanwhile, injectables spread throughout the Egyptian system despite the fact that most providers were not
adequately briefed on the screening, counseling, or monitoring required with this method. "The absence of an
introduction plan and of clear guidelines on their use, as well as the poor knowledge on the part of the service
provider and policy planners...[resulted in] adverse publicity in the national press and among the public," state
Hassan and Fathalla, leading to a ban on the use of injectables altogether. The method has since been reintroduced in Egypt, taking into account the lessons on provider knowledge and client counseling.
Norplant® implants are the newest addition to the array of contraceptives available to women in Egypt. Starting
from the first acceptability studies in 1988, greater care has been taken to address women's need for adequate
information and providers' need for technical training and follow-up. Toward that end, a national Norplant®
Registry will ensure that women can be located for check-ups and removal at the appropriate time. Based on
the findings ol earlier studies about the difficulties women encountered in having the implant removed, efforts
are now directed to making the system more responsive to women's requests. In addition, a national monitor
ing committee has established policy guidelines in advance of widespread use of the method. For the first time
in Egypt. NGOs and women's health activists will participate with the relevant governmental agencies in over
seeing the introduction process.
Source: Ezzeldin Osman Hassan and Mahmoud Fathalla.
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In their review of target-setting in Egypt.
Khalil and Myntti point to three concerns.
First, the method for setting targets may be
confusing and arbitrary, leaving some
providers at the district level saddled with
unrealistic goals. Second, quotas and tar
gets have become the most common and
sometimes the only means of evaluating
programs. Moreover, incentives are offered
to workers in government clinics to offset
their low pay. Because payments are based
on a share of the cost of methods deliv
ered, there is inducement to offer the more
expensive ones, such as ILIDs. over those
that are less costly, such as pills, irrespec
tive of a client's health profile. In addition,
a "preoccupation with numbers—numbers
of contraceptives distributed, and the num
bers of new acceptors of certain methods—

has to affect the kind of information com
municated between provider and client, the
real choice of method given, and possibly
even its clinical appropriateness."
Lessons from Turkey
Ambitious targets and quotas were a defin
ing feature of the Turkish family planning
program from the sixties through the mideighties. Early on, the national Directorate of
family planning set a goal of reaching 5 per
cent of Turkish married "women, a rate ol
some 300,000 women. "Besides being all too
clearly overambitious," writes Cem Behar.
"the program considered Turkish women
only in their childbearing function (and
treated] family planning policy as a purely
mechanical and logistical problem." Not sur
prisingly, the program recruited only one
tenth of the number of new users projected.

Promoting "Kecicfi tig for Hi~eryo)U'" through the development of libraries

Turkey's program also operated as though
all contraceptive users must necessarily be
women, overlooking, "a crucial historical
fact: Turkey was and largely still is a coun
try •with a strong tradition of male methods
and initiative in contraception."
By custom, Turkish men marry only after
they are economically secure, and play a
major role in providing for and rearing chil
dren. Moreover, they take a virtually
unprecedented level of responsibility for
preventing pregnancy: one survey in 1988
showed that nearly two thirds of Turkish
couples using contraception were relying
on methods that required either male initia
tive, such as withdrawal or condoms, or
required male knowledge and participa
tion, such as periodic abstinence or other
traditional methods.
"Withdrawal," states Behar, "has always
been presented as a simple but inefficient
method, one having very high rates of fail
ure. [But] this is far from being true in
Turkey." In fact, surveys show low failure
rates especially among lower education
groups. Traditional contraceptive methods
in Turkey are backed up by legal abortion
services in cases of failure, but have not
received attention from the national family
planning program. 18

Treidiliuitcif crtiflsprorfclc cultural continuity
mid income for Muroccini ii'
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Broadening choice
"Broadening contraceptive choice is an
important element of quality services and a
successful program," write Ezzeldin Osman
Hassan and Mahmoud F. Fathalla. A review
of data from several developing countries 1 ''
showed that the addition of one method
throughout a country will, on average, raise
the use of contraceptives among married
couples by about 12 percent. Hassan and
Fathalla call for greater choice in the num
ber of methods available, emphasizing that
the availability of an array of choices
makes it possible for clients who are dissat
isfied with one method to switch to another
more acceptable method, rather than dis-

continuing use altogether. Moreover, it is not
just the range of choices available, but the
way they are presented to clients, and the
degree of sensitivity to client's needs that
make the difference in program success.
In Egypt, an earlier focus on the delivery of
contraceptive pills, combined with inadequate
counselling offered to clients on their properuse, undercut both the ability of couples to
limit childbearing and the ability of the gov
ernment to reduce fertility. While the theoreti
cal failure rate of pills is estimated at only 1
percent per 100 users, the rate in Egypt was
found to reach 8 percent in 1988. Later pro
gram efforts were directed toward counseling
and training, with special attention to pharma
cists, the most frequent providers of pills. The
accurate use of modern contraceptives is
directly related to educational levels, a finding
that also signals the need for close attention
to counseling in a country such as Egypt,
'where a majority of women cannot read and
are therefore at a disadvantage in terms of
printed information.
A parallel situation exists in other countries,
such as Iran -where, according to Homa
Hoodfar, lack of attention to counseling and
inadequate supplies are a problem. A 1991
study of contraceptive users in 2000 urban
and rural households revealed that 15 percent
of women in cities and about 31 percent of
women in rural areas were relying on contra
ceptive pills as their main method of fertility
control. A high proportion of women took the
pill either every other night or only before
intercourse. Lack of information was one rea
son; others included efforts to reduce the
side-effects of the pill (both perceived and
real), as -well as attempts to stretch supplies.
In Jordan, studies by the World Bank, the
Jordanian Ministry of Health, and the
Population Council reveal that inadequate
quality of care has resulted in extensive
under-use of family planning and other health
care facilities. In a review of information, edu
cation and communication aspects of familyplanning in Jordan. Sima Bahous and her col-

Table 3:
Gynecological and Related
Illnesses among Women
in Gtza, Egypt, 199O-93
Prevalence of morbidity conditions
among all women in the study (%)
Condition

Reproductive tract infections ..................................................51
Genital prolapse
Any .......................................................................................56
Severe ..................................................................................29
Urinary tract infections ...........................................................14
Anemia
Any .......................................................................................63
Severe ..................................................................................17
Obesity
Any .......................................................................................43
Severe ..................................................................................20
High blood pressure
Any .......................................................................................18
Severe ....................................................................................6
Prevalence of morbidity conditions
among contraceptive users (%)
IUD users

Reproductive tract infections ..................................................60
Severe genital prolapse .......................................................... 32
Urinary tract infections ...........................................................16
Severe anemia .........................................................................21
Pill users
Obesity ....................................................................................51
High blood pressure ...............................................................18

Data are bused on a survey of 509 women in two villages.
Source: Huda Zurayk, Nabil Younis and Hind Khattab.

laborators note that more than 50 percent
of all Jordanian Ministry of Health physi
cians had not been trained to deliver pri
mary health care. Interviews with clients
reflected •widespread dissatisfaction with
the quality of information they received
from clinics and a need for better informa
tion and greater attention from physicians.
These experiences reveal that the problems
are inherent to programs not oriented
toward clients' needs. "Only the clients can
make an informed judgement on the trade
off between high effectiveness and incon
venience or side-effects," write Hassan and
Fathalla, "and they will make their choice
based on subjective judgement...their prior
perceptions about methods of contracep
tion and on how convenient a method is to
them."

Signs of change
Even as these problems surface, signs of
change are evident in some quarters. With
rising awareness of the health, human
rights, and demographic dimensions of
family planning, more and more profes
sionals, non-governmental organization
activists and governments have begun to
respond by reshaping their agendas in parts
of the region. In Egypt, for example, a shift
toward client-based perspectives is percep
tible in the introduction of new methods,
according to Hassan and Fathalla. Egypt's
experience with the introduction of two dif
ferent contraceptive methods — injectables
and implants — reveals both the pitfalls of
conventional programs, and the positive
change that has occurred recently under
the Ministry of Population and Family
Welfare, (see Box 5).
The Egyptian government has also institut
ed a Clinical Services Improvement pro
gram to address quality of care in its
facilities. While it has riot yet discarded
incentives or quotas, the program is work
ing to make them less prone to abuse and
more supportive of quality. Among the
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Box 6

Rethinking Family
Planning Programs
According to a group of Egyptian researchers, the
shift from fertility control to health-based family
planning programs will require a number of steps,
including:
Making family planning part of a wider reproductive
health concern for women and men;
Broadening the perspective on reproductive health
care to consider the spectrum of diseases that
women suffer, many of which are simple to treat
but contraindicated for certain methods of contra
ception;
Taking steps immediately to implement the easiest
interventions, such as measuring height and
weight, testing for anemia, reading blood pressure,
and examining for genital prolapse;
Ensuring that clinics have the means to diagnose
and treat reproductive infections or are linked to
other facilities that can do so through a referral
network;
Expanding concern for women's reproductive
health throughout their life cycle since some
reproductive morbidity conditions tend to rise with
age;
Ensuring that women receive appropriate methods
of contraception by giving providers a range of
methods to offer.
Supporting community level research, both on pat
terns of reproductive illness, and on women's per
ceptions of their own health in order to be able to
incorporate their needs and preferences into
appropriate services.
Source: Huda Zurayk, Nahil Younis and Hind Khattab.

steps being taken is to make incentives uni
form across all methods in the hope of elimi
nating the current tendency of providers to
promote a particular method, rather than
provide a choice. And to change the ways in
which programs are evaluated, a checklist of
qualitative indicators of care from the client's
perspective has been developed. Using these
tools, the performance of each clinic will be
evaluated every three months.
Since the mid-eighties, the Turkish program
also has begun emphasizing quality. In
1984, both the number of methods avail
able and the channels through which they
diversified.
•was
distributed
were
Information and education for men began
to be disseminated through programs in
the army and in labor unions.
The reproductive health dimension
In many developing countries, illness and
death from causes related to pregnancy
and childbirth occur at rates 100 or more
times higher than those in the industrial
countries of the West2". While the tragic and
avoidable toll of maternal mortality is slow
ly becoming a health policy priority, less
attention is given to debilitating conditions
beyond the childbearing episode, and mini
mal attention is given to the reproductive
health need of adolescent girls, or the
needs of older women.
A large-scale study of medical and social
factors in Egypt found that reproductive
tract infections and other reproductive ill
nesses are much more common than previ
ously thought. The survey, conducted by
an interdisciplinary team of medical and
social scientists coordinated by Huda
Zurayk, revealed the extent of women's
reproductive health needs in two rural vil
lages of Giza district. Patterns of contracep
tive use among the women closely
approximated the national average; about
42 percent of currently married women had
used contraception at some point, primarily
ILJDs and contraceptive pills.

Reproductive illnesses were
widespread among this popu
lation of women. Just over half
•were found to have reproduc
tive tract infections, and a sim
from
suffered
ilar share
prolapse, a condition in which
the muscles of the uterus or
other organs become extremely weakened
(see Table 3). A majority were anemic; and
a large share had high rates of obesity,
high blood pressure, and other problems
likely to exacerbate reproductive illness.
Moreover, the researchers noted that while
only 15 percent of these women were free
of gynecological and other closely related
conditions, half were found to have two or
more of these problems. And both the
number and severity of reproductive illness
was found to increase with age.
The researchers looked at the intersection
of contraceptive use with the conditions
prevalent among these women. The survey
revealed that women whose health status
implied considerable risk for certain meth
ods -were in fact using those methods any
way. High rates of reproductive tract
infections were found among IUD users,
and a fifth of women -with ILJDs were
severely anemic. In fact, nearly two thirds
of users were found to have two or more
conditions that could pose greater damage
when coupled with use of inappropriate
contraceptives.
These findings, noted Zurayk and her col
leagues, "raise serious questions about the
contact of women •with the health system,
both in terms of source of supply for con
traceptives and in terms of treatment for
reproductive health problems." Of particu
lar concern, the prevalence of diseases was
as high among those -who had sought a
physician's care for their condition as
among those who had not, indicating "a
problem in the process of seeking and
undertaking health care that calls for a
rethinking of family planning policy".
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In .summary, the regional information now
available on reproductive health points to
an ambitious agenda of program action
needed in the coming period (see box 6).
Mahmoud Fathalla echoed the sentiments
of many participants at the Cairo sympo
sium in proposing a new commitment to
the "ten commandments" of high quality
women's health programs.
Lessons gleaned from examining the
dynamics of family, gender, and population

policy in the Middle East are in some ways
unique to the region. Yet these lessons also
reflect world-wide challenges to population
policies, and provide insights into ways to
broaden their scope and effectiveness.
Regional values and priorities parallel
emerging international concerns in several
areas, including emphasis on male respon
sibility for reproductive behavior and the
support of children; the importance of
responsible sexuality; and a high value
placed on parenthood.

Box 7

The Ten Commandments of
Reproductive Health Care:
A Signpost for All Clinics
We are a woman-friendly service:
1. We uphold the principle that Family planning is a dignified, voluntary and informed choice.
2. We need your business. We are open to serve you at times of your convenience, not our convenience. Our
outreach service is ready to knock at your door.
3. We excel in counseling. We not only listen to you, we will hear you.
4. We offer you a broad choice of contraceptives including the good old ones and the more recent technolo
gies.
5. We are not in the business of promoting contraceptive methods for their demographic impact. The method
you prefer is our method, and your safety and convenience is our primary concern.
6. We only add to our inventory methods that our services can deliver while insuring your safety, and due
respect for your voluntary choice.
7. We encourage and promote men's participation and responsibility.
8. You will find us sympathetic and caring in case you are faced by the possibility of or are burdened with an
unwanted pregnancy.
9. We care as much about protecting you from sexually transmitted infections as we care about protecting you
from unwanted pregnancies.
10. We will not miss an opportunity'to help you with other reproductive health needs or problems which you
may have. Our demographic competitors are running out of business. We are in business because we are the
future.

Source: Mahmoud Fathalla, Statement presented at the final session entitled "Future Directions for Research and Policy" at the
Population Council symposium in Cairo, 1994.

44

Conclusion:
Diversity and Change
The great regional diversity in policies and
development paths taken by Middle
Eastern societies reinforces an important
truth: there are many -ways of accomodating change while remaining faithful to val
ued cultural traditions. This also suggests
that countries will be most successful in
achieving their population goals -while pro
moting human well-being, when policy
measures are broadened to address multi
ple aspects of fertility, health status, gender
parity and economic security.
The research summarized throughout this
paper emphasizes the need to view women
and men in the context of their family rela
tionships and the socioeconomic conditions
in which they live. Middle Eastern women
sometimes find themselves caught between
conflicting signals from governments and
religious institutions about their status, com
pounded by a sense of insecurity -within
marriage. Given this context, having large
families remains a rational social and eco
nomic strategy for many -women. Evidence
reviewed here clearly points to a connec
tion between -women's gains in education,
employment and health, their greater sense
of autonomy on one hand, and the motiva
tion to have small families on the other.
These connections need to be addressed
through investments in broader social and
economic policies across many sectors.
In recognition of this, the Second Amman
and
Population
on
Declaration
Development in the Arab World, drafted in
advance of the ICPD, states that "women,
like men, play a critical role in society.
Sustainable development cannot be real
ized -without ensuring women's participa

tion,... improving women's quality of life in
all its aspects, and securing the economic,
social, education, cultural, psychological
and health conditions needed to enable
them to play their role fully as citizens." 21
Enhancing gender parity and supporting
partnerships between women and men in
families are basic steps that have been ini
tiated in some countries of the region. The
egalitarian ethic that can be found in Islam
provides ample opportunity for reforming
personal status laws and for changing poli
cies that perpetuate inequity and endanger
the stability of families — a fact not suffi
ciently recognized in the past.
Despite some recent increases in religious
and political conservatism, most Middle
Easterners support advances in the position
of women and have high aspirations for
their daughters. At the same time, they
-would like to preserve aspects of their cul
ture and traditions that are meaningful,
such as close ties between generations in
the family and solidarity among women.
Finally, population policy needs to shift so
that contraceptive delivery is relocated
-within the framework of reproductive
health care. The costs to women, to fami
lies, and to societies of -widespread repro
ductive illness and death are too high to be
ignored. Neglecting these problems contra
venes the principles of Islam and the tradi
tionally high value placed on sound
reproductive health. In this matter, regional
concerns complement the agenda of the
international development community to
achieve conditions under which rights to
health are safeguarded for all.
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In each of these areas, the Middle East
offers both a rich body of past experience,
and many new opportunities for promoting
change. Effective change will be enhanced
if research findings are creatively applied
to the task of policy reformulation. Looking
to the International Conference on
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Population and Development and beyond,
Middle Eastern governments, researchers,
and non-governmental organizations have
an historic opportunity to exchange experi
ence and forge the cooperative links need
ed to address the regional and global
challenges of the decades to come.
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